This article is part of a multi-part series on Tactical Fire Ground Options.
The old saying “one size fits all” has been applied to the fire service for the last 150 years and in many cases it has worked fairly well. Unfortunately, with the diversity in building construction, fuel loads, staffing and response times, “one size never fits all” is a more appropriate depiction for today’s fire service.
We have all found ourselves portraying the tactical Monday morning quarterback on YouTube, trying to decode the events of a fire from a very short video and try to justify how we would have handled the incident or question why they did what they did. Over the next few months, this article series will hopefully help with defining those tactical decisions.
For over 150 years, the American fire service has provided fire suppression through aggressive tactics performed fearlessly at all hours of the day in all different locations around the country. We are all very proud of the traditions of the American fire service, and in most cases that pride is what drew us into the profession. The study of modern fire behavior does not impact how aggressive we are or the pride we have in our traditions. It does not make us softer and I am not advocating that we become “exterior defensive” fire departments. Through this article, I hope that you challenge yourself to make tactical decisions that allow you and your organization to perform more efficiently and effectively and provide better customer service to both your community (exterior customer) and your firefighters (interior customer).
The first step for all of us is to accept that the fight has changed and it changed without us recognizing or knowing that it changed. To quote Joe Starnes from Kill the Flash Over, “These aren’t the fires your daddy fought.” Joe’s reference suggests the fight changed and the incidents that the previous generations attended took a different set of skills and tactics to combat them. Today’s fires burn hotter, advance faster and catch us off guard more often because we are anticipating them to perform or react like our "daddy’s” fires. Couple today’s fire behavior with lightweight construction, increased fuel loads, reduced staffing and extended response times, we are setting ourselves up for catastrophic failure.
It should not be a surprise to any of you that NIST, UL and KTF (Kill The Flash Over) have all produced documentation that scientifically proves today’s fires respond differently to the application of traditional tactics. If you haven’t read or reviewed any of these studies, UL Attic Fires Test, UL Vertical Vent Test, UL Positive Pressure Test, KTF BURNS, then you have some homework to do. Although we succeed and outperform the fire with traditional tactics 99% of the time, is 1% really an acceptable safety margin? There are 28,537 commercial flights on average each day in the USA. (National Air Controllers Association) If the Federal Aviation Association accepted a 1% safety margin there would be 2,854 flights crashing daily! Obviously, we do not accept 1% safety margin for flying, so why do we accept it for our fire tactics?
The second realization that we must agree on is that there are distinct differences in tactical options for commercial occupancies versus residential occupancies. With that said, for this article series we will focus only on residential occupancies and the tactics that apply to them.
Over the course of the next few months we will cover the impacts of "Duck and Dive", transitional attack, vertical vent, positive pressure vent and vent limited tactics on modern day residential structures. One key component for this article is that there are no absolutes, and the words 'always' and 'never' should be removed from our vocabulary. The fire ground is very dynamic and conditions change rapidly; however, there are some consistencies in fire behavior and how they correlate to the tactics we select. Throughout this series, this concept is what we will be addressing; one tactic never fits all conditions. Just like a good football coach chooses the correct play, an incident commander must select the correct tactic for the fire conditions.
For this issue, let’s take a closer look at the traditional “Duck and Dive” tactic which consists of the initial engine company arriving on scene of a small residential house with smoke showing from the roof line. (Vent limited) From the windshield, the company officer makes the decision to conduct an “aggressive” interior fire attack. The engineer positions the apparatus and engages the pump, fire fighter “A” dives out the back of the cab full of adrenaline thinking “let’s do this”! The company officer may or may not complete a 360 depending on the organization. (If a 360 is completed, does the officer have a set of critical factors that they look for to assist in making tactical decisions?) The company officer meets fire fighter “A” at the front door. Being the seasoned, trained fire fighters that they are, they try the front door; locked. With a grin, they give the door the boot, opening the door only to encounter heavy black smoke billowing out the door. They cinch up their face pieces at the front door and dive under the smoke (black fire, super-heated gasses, fuel) and proceed to conduct their interior search and fire attack. As they progress into the structure, they start to encounter excessive heat and limited visibility. They fight and struggle through the heat and limited visibility until they have reached their limitation and bail or retreat out of the occupancy.
The previous scenario is a pretty standard tactical response for most departments.
What are the limitation and risks of the “Duck and Dive” tactic?
The old saying “one size fits all” has been applied to the fire service for the last 150 years and in many cases it has worked fairly well. Unfortunately, with the diversity in building construction, fuel loads, staffing and response times, “one size never fits all” is a more appropriate depiction for today’s fire service.
We have all found ourselves portraying the tactical Monday morning quarterback on YouTube, trying to decode the events of a fire from a very short video and try to justify how we would have handled the incident or question why they did what they did. Over the next few months, this article series will hopefully help with defining those tactical decisions.
For over 150 years, the American fire service has provided fire suppression through aggressive tactics performed fearlessly at all hours of the day in all different locations around the country. We are all very proud of the traditions of the American fire service, and in most cases that pride is what drew us into the profession. The study of modern fire behavior does not impact how aggressive we are or the pride we have in our traditions. It does not make us softer and I am not advocating that we become “exterior defensive” fire departments. Through this article, I hope that you challenge yourself to make tactical decisions that allow you and your organization to perform more efficiently and effectively and provide better customer service to both your community (exterior customer) and your firefighters (interior customer).
The first step for all of us is to accept that the fight has changed and it changed without us recognizing or knowing that it changed. To quote Joe Starnes from Kill the Flash Over, “These aren’t the fires your daddy fought.” Joe’s reference suggests the fight changed and the incidents that the previous generations attended took a different set of skills and tactics to combat them. Today’s fires burn hotter, advance faster and catch us off guard more often because we are anticipating them to perform or react like our "daddy’s” fires. Couple today’s fire behavior with lightweight construction, increased fuel loads, reduced staffing and extended response times, we are setting ourselves up for catastrophic failure.
It should not be a surprise to any of you that NIST, UL and KTF (Kill The Flash Over) have all produced documentation that scientifically proves today’s fires respond differently to the application of traditional tactics. If you haven’t read or reviewed any of these studies, UL Attic Fires Test, UL Vertical Vent Test, UL Positive Pressure Test, KTF BURNS, then you have some homework to do. Although we succeed and outperform the fire with traditional tactics 99% of the time, is 1% really an acceptable safety margin? There are 28,537 commercial flights on average each day in the USA. (National Air Controllers Association) If the Federal Aviation Association accepted a 1% safety margin there would be 2,854 flights crashing daily! Obviously, we do not accept 1% safety margin for flying, so why do we accept it for our fire tactics?
The second realization that we must agree on is that there are distinct differences in tactical options for commercial occupancies versus residential occupancies. With that said, for this article series we will focus only on residential occupancies and the tactics that apply to them.
Over the course of the next few months we will cover the impacts of "Duck and Dive", transitional attack, vertical vent, positive pressure vent and vent limited tactics on modern day residential structures. One key component for this article is that there are no absolutes, and the words 'always' and 'never' should be removed from our vocabulary. The fire ground is very dynamic and conditions change rapidly; however, there are some consistencies in fire behavior and how they correlate to the tactics we select. Throughout this series, this concept is what we will be addressing; one tactic never fits all conditions. Just like a good football coach chooses the correct play, an incident commander must select the correct tactic for the fire conditions.
For this issue, let’s take a closer look at the traditional “Duck and Dive” tactic which consists of the initial engine company arriving on scene of a small residential house with smoke showing from the roof line. (Vent limited) From the windshield, the company officer makes the decision to conduct an “aggressive” interior fire attack. The engineer positions the apparatus and engages the pump, fire fighter “A” dives out the back of the cab full of adrenaline thinking “let’s do this”! The company officer may or may not complete a 360 depending on the organization. (If a 360 is completed, does the officer have a set of critical factors that they look for to assist in making tactical decisions?) The company officer meets fire fighter “A” at the front door. Being the seasoned, trained fire fighters that they are, they try the front door; locked. With a grin, they give the door the boot, opening the door only to encounter heavy black smoke billowing out the door. They cinch up their face pieces at the front door and dive under the smoke (black fire, super-heated gasses, fuel) and proceed to conduct their interior search and fire attack. As they progress into the structure, they start to encounter excessive heat and limited visibility. They fight and struggle through the heat and limited visibility until they have reached their limitation and bail or retreat out of the occupancy.
The previous scenario is a pretty standard tactical response for most departments.
What are the limitation and risks of the “Duck and Dive” tactic?
- Forcing and failing to control the front door created a bi-directional flow path. By doing this you now enter a foot race against the flow path which is supplying an unlimited amount of air (O2) to the fire. Let me remind you that your foot race is occurring under super-heated gasses that are aggressively seeking oxygen to mix with so they can ignite, creating a lean flash over.
- Ignoring the “black fire”(smoke) conditions as you crawl under them and not securing the environment as you search by gas cooling or surface cooling to slow the fire growth places you in a very hazardous environment. We have a fear of flowing water; it has been drilled into our heads that we will steam the victim. Gas cooling and surface cooling are controlled nozzle techniques that we must teach to prevent steam injuries.
- Not finding the fire occupancy due to poor tactical intelligence (360) and then having to retreat to a defensive position because of rapid fire growth.
- Not completing the rescue because of the decreased time frame of rescue operations due to rapid fire growth.
- Over extending the safety factor of our PPE, including your face piece. Our protective clothing offers better protection than the previous generations and thus we extend ourselves further into the hazard zone. Our PPE can only absorb so much heat before it fails to protect us, and unfortunately there isn't a warning system so our only method of knowing when it fails, is when it burns us.
What are the benefits of this tactic?
- Potential for quick application of water when there is a known fire location.
- Potential for rapid rescue, when we have a good tactical intel from 360 and a known location of the victim.
With the “Duck and Dive” tactic being a pretty standard response in today’s fire service, here are some critical factors that should be addressed:
- Complete a tactical 360 with the use of a TIC.
- GO-NO-GO
- Temperature
- Turbulence and velocity of the smoke
- Identify the flow path; use windows, doors and eves to assist you in identifying fire conditions.
- Vent limited
- Intake
- Exhaust
- Bi-directional
- Uni-directional
- Identify the fire location, again windows and doors are critical.
- Where is the fire and how can we get to it the fastest?
- Know what an all-black window suggest.
- Know and understand what the turbulence and velocity of the smoke is suggesting.
- Use the neutral plane to assist in locating the fire occupancy.
- Identify the closest entry point to the fire.
- The front door might not be the best access.
- Take a window or door with the least resistance to the fire.
- Stretch a line to the back of the structure, if necessary. Again, we had it drilled in our heads to attack from the un-burned side; this might not always be the most effective.
- GO-NO-GO
- Make certain the following fire ground operations are in place.
- Command
- Communications
- Water supply
- RIC, On Deck Crew
- Know when the opportunity is right to use the “Duck and Dive” tactic.
- When there is a known rescue that is easily reached without extending into the structure.
- In non-vent limited fires; when there is not a defined flow path.
- When the fire is isolated from rest of occupancy and you have a known rescue.
This tactic is a standard response for the American fire service. For many generations it was the most viable tactic and potentially can still be safely used today when applied in the right setting. However, there are significant factors that dictate the success of this tactic with today’s lightweight building construction, fuel loads and limited staffing. By addressing the above critical factors you can make an intelligent based tactical decision.
In the next issue we will take a look at transitional fire attack. Remember, there is nothing absolute about tactical decision making, “One Size Never Fits All.”
In the next issue we will take a look at transitional fire attack. Remember, there is nothing absolute about tactical decision making, “One Size Never Fits All.”
---
Jason Caughey is the Fire Chief with the Laramie County Fire District #2 in Cheyenne, Wyoming and an Adjunct Professor for Laramie County Community College where he teaches a semester course “The principles of fire behavior”. Prior to arriving in Cheyenne in 2011 he was the Fire Chief of Gore Hill Fire Rescue in Great Falls Montana. In addition, he spent 10 years working for the Montana Fire Services Training School as a regional instructor and regional training manager for the state of Montana.
His fire behavior journey began in 2001 when he was introduced to the English fire service through Jim Mastin and John Taylor (Author of Smoke Burns). These introductions to the English fire service spurred a curiosity and eventually lead to chief Caughey traveling to Manchester England to participate in the English Fire training system.
Chief Caughey has been an active member in the "Kill the Flashover" project lead by Joe Starnes. He is also a current technical member of the Underwriters laboratory Positive Pressure test committee. Chief Caughey has an Associates of Applied Science Degree in Fire Science from Columbia University and will graduate in November with a Bachelor’s degree in Fire Science. In addition, Chief Caughey has served on the IFSTA technical committee for the CHIEFS officer manual and a technical reviewer for Jones and Bartlett Rope Rescue and Trench Rescue training manuals. Chief Caughey is also a technical writer for ISFSI and been published by Fire Chief Magazine.
His fire behavior journey began in 2001 when he was introduced to the English fire service through Jim Mastin and John Taylor (Author of Smoke Burns). These introductions to the English fire service spurred a curiosity and eventually lead to chief Caughey traveling to Manchester England to participate in the English Fire training system.
Chief Caughey has been an active member in the "Kill the Flashover" project lead by Joe Starnes. He is also a current technical member of the Underwriters laboratory Positive Pressure test committee. Chief Caughey has an Associates of Applied Science Degree in Fire Science from Columbia University and will graduate in November with a Bachelor’s degree in Fire Science. In addition, Chief Caughey has served on the IFSTA technical committee for the CHIEFS officer manual and a technical reviewer for Jones and Bartlett Rope Rescue and Trench Rescue training manuals. Chief Caughey is also a technical writer for ISFSI and been published by Fire Chief Magazine.
No comments:
Post a Comment